Monday, September 14, 2009

Mencius. Emotion, reason and Plato's world. The beginning of the "Limits of Reason"?

I'm finding that I'm getting more out of reading the books AFTER the seminars. The rush to read everything for class leaves huge gaps in comprehension and even larger ones in finding specific ideas about passion and reason. It seems that afterwards, as I read the discussions and do some secondary source reading, that I start to find some more meaning and being to pull ideas together.

And then, of course, I've got to keep plowing through for the next class. So I thought I'd try reversing the trend this week and read some secondary stuff as I read the primary text. As to be expected, I'm behind in the readings, but I'm seeing a better picture of what I have read.

The main article that I've read is David Wong's "Is There A Distinction Between Reason And Emotion in Mencius?". The title certainly led me to believe that there were answers to my questions lying within, and there are. But there's also a treatise for a new way to understand emotion. Much of the article was tough sledding for me, having not read any of the ideas that it was referring to, but I did get a very sure sense of where Mencius takes the argument of reason and passion.

Unlike Plato, Genesis and The Qur'an, Mencius doesn't create any contrast between the two, rather arguing that the two work together, drawing a connection between "emotion and recognizing reasons to act.." Moreover, he is very clear that men should strive to live with benevolence and compassion without thought of reward from without, except contentment in this life. All men, that is, except Kings.

The idea, as illustrated by the story of the King who saved the oxen from sacrifice because he couldn't stand the thought of it cringing as it was being led to it's death like a man to his execution. (Book 1A7)

The idea, it seems, is that the emotional reaction, or compassion, that the King shows is an inborn, natural condition, which allows the King to then identify by importance, the salient facts that lead to his decision to spare the oxen. In the story, the King substitutes a goat for the oxen and is reminded both that he didn't wince at the thought of the goat dying simply because he had never seen the goat, and we can't feel compassion for things we don't see. The other lesson is that the King, having the capacity for compassion for the oxen, can also therefore have the capacity for compassion toward his people who suffer greatly from his attempts to expand his kingdom.

This goes toward Mencius' vision of the "True King", one who rules by compassion.

But there seems to be a split in the moral world between Kings and common men. Common men should feel compassion without any thought of their own reward, whereas Kings should expect to gain greater wealth and rule their kingdom more effectively if they become a True King. Do we then make exceptions for the exigent circumstances facing the person? Do Kings face a greater burden than commoners and therefore have less burden to be selfless?

I think, from what I've read, that the key to Kings and the extra burden of discretion they carry, as well as the extra, what, gift?, of striving for rewards outside themselves, lies the key to men's ability to live in harmony. Mencius seems to be saying that good social order is the way for men to live fully in "The Way"

iiiA3: "Those without constant means of support will not have constant hearts... to punish them after they have fallen foul of the law is to set a trap for the people."

Mencius does go a long way to speak against profit over "well-being" of the social order.

In this way there lies another difference between Plato and Mencius. There seems to be a sense that men are all equal (except for Kings) and can all achieve benevolence and equality in their mortal lives.

What I'm gathering here, from the argument made by Wong, is that there are indeed limits to Reason and the rational life posited by Plato. The argument is that reason, void of emotion, is not enough to choose between all the facts available to make a proper decision of action. Emotion helps us understand what is important and how to move forward.

A child has fallen into the well. I feel compassion and am driven to making a decision. Can I help? Will I fall in too and thus not be of help? Do I have a broken leg? Do I have to get to the hospital where my own child's life is in danger? The facts around me are used to make a decision, but it is the response to the situation that drives me to make it.

And that response is "God-given", and so naturally good.

Mencius 2A6:

"No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others.....The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence(Jen); the heart of shame, of dutifulness(i, righteousness); the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites(li, propriety); the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom (ch'i).... For a man possessing these four germs to deny his own potentialities is for him to cripple himself... If a man is able to develop all these four germs that he possesses, it will be like a fire starting up or a spring coming through."

and "Benevolence is the high honour bestowed by Heaven and the peaceful abode of man. Not to be benevolent when nothing stands in the way is to show lack of wisdom"

Sunday, September 13, 2009

More Plato

So my attempts to eneter the discussion on the group page feel very much like the way Stephen described his potential forays into Chinese History: I canget away with saying all kinds of stupid things as I lack any background or context. But I figure the education comes in the attempt. That being said, I'm getting a lot out of the dialogue as it is forming and moving on into the next readings.

The one question that I wrote down in my notes while reading and thought too stupid to ask, is still perhaps the best question: how do we define 'reason" and "passion"? The answer, I think, is to being with the definitions in the texts.

Genesis and The "Q", seem to have it all focused on "good" and "evil". But the players in the dramas of Genesis seem to need to be told by God what the distinction is. And while they are presented with choice, it seems to imply that there is or will be no inherent understanding of the difference by mankind, only a knowledge that punishment follows for disobeyance, reward for good behavior. "God's Will" seems to trump "Man's Better Nature". I suppose that might be the fallout of having eaten the apple and been cast out of the Garden of Eden.

A very clever posting implied that there is no inherent tension between good and evil in Plato's system, but that it was made up of varying, circular degrees of good. I'm not sure I understand that, though. It seems clear that there is a tension between "equilibrium" and "disequilibrium", and that "disequilibrium" is the natural state, and "equilibrium" the desired state, to be sought but never accomplished in life.

This tension, while it doesn't resonate with the big sways of good and evil the way the bible and the Q do, does seem be accompanied by a reward system: a star for the achievers of intelligence, and womanhood or animal-hood or dung-beetledom for those who, by lack of education, lack of god-likeness, fall short.

I couldn't help but feel, albeit in my first-ever reading of Plato, that there was an underlying passion to his argument. I've ordered a book on the concept of intelligent design in Plato from the library. I'll see if I can expand on this notion in some kind of (hopefully) intelligent way.

Thursday, September 10, 2009

Plato's Timaeus

I'm starting my journal here, after the first class, mainly because I wasn't really sure how to start before. I took notes as I read but found that they let me down during the discussion. This is the case, I think, because I was reading the text for basic comprehension, rather than any kind of critical eye toward the ideas of passion and reason. The next post will have some thoughts about the texts, both as they came up during my reading, but more specifically in response to the questions and discussions held in the class.